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SERINGAPATAM.

HIGGINBOTHAM.

1876.

SERINGAPATAM; PAST AND PRESENT.

A MONOGRAPH

BY

COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.,

AUTHOR OF

THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA, &c.

"I have seen the day, with my good biting falchion
"I would have made them skip. I am old now."

KING LEAR,

◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆

MADRAS:
HIGGINBOTHAM AND CO.
1876.

P R E F A C E.

A RESIDENCE of some years in close vicinity to Seringapatam, and the duty often devolving upon me of acting as *cicerone* to the friends and acquaintances who visited Mysore, had naturally made me familiar with the outline of the details of the two sieges of this famous fortress. It was not, however, until Captain Malet of the 18th Hussars came to stay with me in October 1874, that, urged on by his inquiring mind, I made of those details a study. With the books of reference in our hands, he and I used to spend hours in examining each particular point of interest on the spot, and before he left he had extorted from me a promise that I would take an early opportunity to work up the subject for publication.

Other studies, to which I was then committed, chained my attention for some months ; and I had postponed Seringapatam to an indefinite period when the intelligence that H. R. H. the Prince of Wales would pass through the Mysore country stirred me to renewed action. I had scarcely, however, written half a dozen pages when I was called upon to prepare for the journey to Bombay of His Highness the Máhárájá. Before I returned to Mysore the visit of His Royal Highness to that city had been virtually abandoned, and with it also the visit to Seringapatam.

Again the subject dropped. It was revived a few months later by two things : The first was the intelligence which reached me that in renouncing his visit to Mysore, His Royal Highness had expressed the deep regret with which he had

given up his long-cherished desire to visit a fortress so renowned, and testifying so much to the prowess of the British soldier, as Seringapatam : the second,—the enthusiasm displayed, and the encouragement given to me, by some valued friends who accompanied me over the fortress in December 1875 and in January 1876. On the first of these two occasions I renewed the promise given to Captain Malet in October 1874 ;—and I now fulfil it.

True, though it doubtless is, as M. Viollet-le-duc has shewn to the world, that “ Vauban’s fortresses have had their day,” the great results they have accomplished in their time will not the less continue to be regarded with reverence and admiration by the descendants of those who defended or stormed them. Especially will this be the case, when, as with Seringapatam, the breach has remained unrepaired, the position of the besieging army can still easily be traced, and the traveller, viewing the difficulties so daringly conquered, can understand, as by a touch of the magician’s wand, how it was that the great soldier, who made his first successful débüt as a stormer at the head of the supports at Seringapatam, was able subsequently to make of the materials similar to those he then commanded, an army which beat the soldiers of Napoléon, and of which he could proudly affirm that with it “ he could go anywhere and do anything.” If that result was the goal of the great military career of the Duke of Wellington, the real starting point was Seringapatam.

MYSORE, 1st *March* 1876.

G. B. M.

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SERINGAPATAM.

JUST seventy-eight miles from the British cantonment of Bangalore, and nine from the Hindú capital of Mysore, on an island formed by the winding of the river Káverí, may be yet seen and visited the once famous fortress of Seringapatam. To the man who gazes at this fortress from the outside its battlements still present the appearance they offered to the besieging army of General Harris on the morning of the 4th May 1799. The breach through which his troops effected an entrance on that memorable day is preserved, unrepaired, a monument of British prowess ; the ramparts remain now as they were then, the only exception being that the embrasures are empty of guns. The fortress resembles, in fact, a disarmed and blinded giant, in his youth and middle age the terror of the southern peninsula, but who now lies, the helpless and powerless slave of his conqueror, testifying to the living generation that neither strong walls, powerful artillery, nor that courage which is the offspring of love of supremacy and hate to the foe, can withstand the assault of the daring children of the islands of the West.

Thus lies this fortress, still an object of deep, even of passionate, interest to the numbers who flock to visit it. It has known strange vicissitudes. In a cer-

tain point of view its history presents a nearly accurate type of the history of Hindostan. Originally Hindú, threatened then by the Mahomedans, then by the Márhátás, converted subsequently into the Mahomedan capital of Southern India, the strong fortress finally succumbed to the power which had subdued all three. The history of each period is full of interest ; of that relating to British occupation particularly so, for not a century has elapsed since the leader who ruled the country of which it was the representative capital dictated peace to the English under the walls of Madras, and seventy-seven years ago its final subjugation was regarded by the greatest of Indian Governors-General as the crowning act which settled for ever the question of British supremacy in Southern India.

The island on which Seringapatam stands is formed by the divergence of two arms of the river Káverí. It is about three and a half miles in length, and one mile and a half in breadth across its centre, which is its broadest part. The natural lay of the land on the island falls and narrows from its centre towards its extremities. But at its lowest point it is still considerably above the river level at its greatest height. The west end of the island, on which the fortress is built, slopes more especially towards the north, in such a way that the rising ground on the opposite side of the river commands a distinct view of the interior.*

The fortress covers a space of about two thousand square yards. Its northern and western fronts are covered by the river, which thus forms an enormous

* Dirom's Narrative.

wet ditch, neither fordable nor navigable between the months of June and November.

Prior to the year 1792 the great strength of Serin-gapatain lay, indeed, in the development of the natural strength of the soil. Thus, excepting the northwest bastion, the entire revetment was formed of natural blocks of granite of an enormous size. The ditches were excavated from the rock itself; whilst, on the northern side, a glacis had been cut in the living rock, though, from the fact of the counterscarp having been left incomplete in two places, a continuous covering was not afforded to the rampart. On the eastern and western sides it was surrounded by double walls, each wall covered by a double ditch; the gates were covered by exterior works; the northwest angle,—that assaulted in 1799,—was defended by a strong interior work; whilst, in the centre of the fortress and on the southern rampart were strong cavaliers.

But in 1792 it was greatly strengthened. On the east of the place a covered way was built *en crêmaillère* in order to defend that face from an enfilading fire from the northern bank of the river. Works of a similar character were added to the parapet of the northern rampart, where also cavaliers and traverses *en gazon* were built. To the north eastern angle of the fortress a bastion on the latest European system was then added; whilst, just before the siege of 1799 a second interior rampart, covered by a deep ditch, was hastily erected along the whole length of the northern face.

About this period, likewise several sluices were constructed for the purpose of admitting and retaining

the river water in the ditches. From the north eastern angle of the fortress, likewise, the river bank was scarped and covered by a parapet extending as far as the Darya-daolat, the summer palace of Tippú Sultán. The eastern face of the garden in which this palace is situated was defended by a rampart and ditch, and, starting from this point, a good intrenchment traversed the island right up to the bridge which separated it from the mainland.

As it stood in 1792, the fortress and its environs are thus described by Major Dirom, who was present as Deputy Adjutant-General at the siege of 1792 :—

“ The fort and outworks occupy about a mile of the west end of the island, and the Lál Bágh* about the same portion of the east end.

The whole space between the Fort and the Lál Bágh, except a small enclosure, called the Daolat Bágh, on the north bank near the fort, was filled, before the war, with houses, and formed an extensive suburb, of which the village of Gánjam is the only remaining part, the rest having been destroyed by Tippú to make room for batteries to defend the island and to form an esplanade to the fort.

The town, of modern structure, built on the middle and highest part of the island, is about half a mile square, divided into regular cross streets, all wide, and shaded on each side by trees, and full of good houses. It is surrounded by a strong mud wall, and seemed to have been preserved for the accommodation of the bazar people and merchants, and for the convenience

of the troops stationed on that part of the island for its defence.

A little way to the eastward of the town is the entrance into the Lál Bágh. It was laid out in regular shady walks of large cypress trees, and full of fruit trees, flowers, and vegetables of every description.

“The fort thus situated on the west end of the island is distinguished by its white walls, regular outworks, magnificent buildings, and ancient Hindú pagodas, contrasted with the more lofty and splendid monuments lately raised in honour of the Mahomedan faith. The Lál Bágh, which occupies the east end of the island, possessing all the beauty and convenience of a country retirement, is dignified by the mausoleum of Haidar and a superb new palace built by Tippú. To these add the idea of an extensive suburb or town, which filled the middle space between the fort and the garden, full of wealthy industrious inhabitants, and it will readily be allowed that this insulated metropolis must have been the richest, most convenient, and beautiful spot possessed in the present age by any native prince in India.”

Such indeed it may have been prior to 1792, but it is so no longer. The dismantled fort, the open breach, the towering minarets, the village of Gánjám, the garden and country house of Tippú, the mausoleum of Haidar and his son, still indeed remain ; but the white walls, the Hindú pagodas, the magnificent buildings, the splendid palace in the Lál Bágh, the good houses, and the wealthy inhabitants have long since been things of the past. The fortunes of the town have followed the fortunes of the fortress, and the decay of the one has supervened on the dismantlement of the other ! But it

is not with the Seringapatam of the present that I have to do. With but one solitary exception, which I shall notice in its place, all its romance is concentrated in the period prior to and ending in 1799. To that period, which might not inappropriately be styled the rise and fall of Seringapatam, I propose now to refer.

The earliest mention in history of Seringapatam goes back as far as 1133. In that year, it is stated, Rájá Vishnú Verdaná, of the Bákkál dynasty, converted from the Jain to the Vishnavite form of faith by a Brahman named Rámaná Charlú, conferred on that apostle and his followers the tract of country on either side of the river at Seringapatam, and known, then as now, by the general name of Ashtagram or the eight townships.

This tract of land would appear to have remained in the possession of the descendants of those settlers for more than three hundred years, during which time they were subject to the Hindú dynasty reigning in Bijanagar. Nor was it until 1454 that one of them, named Timmaná, asked and obtained permission to erect there a fort and temple. The fort, built in honour of the god Ranga, he called Sri-ranga-patan or the city of the holy Ranga. The temple was dedicated to the same patron ; its dimensions at first were small, but were subsequently greatly enlarged by their founder, he having obtained materials by demolishing 101 Jain temples at Kaláswári, a village, still existing, midway between Seringapatam and Mysore.

For some years the town and fort of Seringapatam continued to be governed by the descendants of Timmaná, but the time at last arrived when the rising

importance of the place required that it should be ruled by a Viceroy appointed from Bijianagar. The exact date when the transfer was made I have not been able accurately to ascertain, but it is scarcely material to the narrative. It probably occurred before the close of the fifteenth century. But in the year 1564 the kingdom of Bijianagar succumbed itself to a coalition of the Mahomedan kings of the Dekhan. Seringapatam, however, was not affected by this overthrow. The Bijianagar Viceroy, Trimal Ráj, still reigned there unassailed, at least by the Mahomedans. The enemy he most dreaded, and with whom he had had constant differences, was the ruler of a rising power whose capital lay within ten miles of his own fortress—the Rájá of Mysore. Till 1610, however, Trimal Ráj maintained this last dependency of his royal house. But, in that year, “worn down with age and disease,” foreseeing that his power, long undermined, must inevitably succumb sooner or later to his ambitious neighbour, he determined to retire from the cares of Government. He entered, then, into a compromise with Ráj Wadiar, Rájá of Mysore, in virtue of which he retired to spend the remainder of his days at Talkád. Seringapatam was at once peaceably occupied by Ráj Wadiar, who made it the seat of his Government.

Twenty-eight years later Seringapatam stood its first siege. The assailants were the troops of the Mahomedan king of Bijapúr commanded by a General of repute, Rand Dhúla Khan. The defenders, the Mysore army, were led by their youthful sovereign, Cantarava Narsá Ráj, the third in descent from Ráj Wadiar. Of

this siege no minute details have reached us. It is only known that the Mahomedans having effected a practicable breach, made a general assault, but were not only repulsed with great slaughter, but followed up and severely harassed. The sovereign, who had thus gallantly defended his fortress, took an early opportunity to augment its defences, and, noting the signs of the times, supplied it (1654) with provisions and military stores so as to enable it to offer a protracted resistance to any invader.

For twenty-four years after the failure of the Mahomedan invasion Seringapatam remained unassailed. But in 1662 a new enemy presented himself. This was the Rájá of Bednúr, urged on by the fugitive descendant of the ancient royal family of Bijianagar who had taken refuge at his court. Again, however, the besiegers were foiled. Again, too, minute details are wanting, this alone being certain that the besiegers retreated in confusion and dismay to Bednúr.

But more stirring times were approaching. In 1697, the still maiden fortress was suddenly assailed by a Márhátá army, acting as auxiliary to Zúlfikár Khan, General of the renowned Aurangzíb. At that time the main army of the Mysoreans was before Trichinápalí, and Seringapatam had been left with a feeble garrison. But, learning of its danger, the Dalwai,* then before Trichinápalí, despatched a force under his son to its relief. On approaching the fortress the relieving army outwitted the enemy and completely defeated them.

* Dalwai, the title of the holder of the hereditary office of Commander-in-Chief in Mysore.

The next danger, however, occurring in 1755, was greater. The assailants were the troops of the Subadár of the Dekhan, led by the renowned Bussy, and aided by 500 Frenchmen. Their object was to exact the tribute, acknowledged but never paid, by the Rájás of Mysore to the representative of the Mogul. At that time, too, the bulk of the Mysore army was at Trichinápalí aiding the French in their contest against the English. The celerity of Bussy's march made it impossible for the Dalwai, Dévaráj Urs, who commanded in Seringapatam, to hold out till that army should arrive to relieve him. Bussy lost not a moment in making regular approaches against the north-east angle of the fortress. In a few days an assault would have been delivered, the result of which had been scarcely doubtful, when Dévaráj agreed to pay the demand of fifty-six lakhs of rupees. But the treasury was empty. One-third of the amount was raised by the plate and jewels of the Hindú temples and the immediate property and ornaments of the Rájá, and bills were accepted for the remainder. But it was found impossible to meet the bills on maturity. They never were met, in fact, and of the gomashitas who had been taken off by the besiegers as personal securities for payment many died in prison.

Two years later the Peshwa, Bálájí Ráo, appeared before Seringapatam with an army. At that time the country was distracted by internal contentions. The Rájá was a virtual prisoner within his palace : the Dalwai, Dévaráj, was sulking in a corner of the province ; his brother Nanjanráj, was Mayor of the palace ; and Haidar Ali, who commanded a portion of the army,

was already brooding over plans to secure that post for himself. The defence, however, was ably conducted by Nanjanráj, and had he ordered up his army from Dindigal, it would probably have succeeded. But, he did not do so, and before Haidar could arrive to aid him, Nanjanráj was forced to come to terms. He had to pay heavily for his defeat, and was forced to yield fourteen districts and to pay five lakhs of rupees before the Márhátás would depart.

The next attempt upon the fortress took place after Haidar Ali had succeeded in virtually supplanting the Hindú dynasty. It was made by the Márhátás under Trimbak Ráo, who preceded it by inflicting upon the Mysore army led by Haidar and Tippú a defeat at Chirkúlí, eleven miles to the west of Seringapatam. When this battle engaged Haidar was suffering from intoxication, and Tippú from the effects of a fearful beating administered to him by his father when in that state. The natural result was defeat. The beaten army, almost disarmed, hurried panic-stricken into Seringapatam that night, and had the Márhátás followed them up, the place would assuredly have fallen. But Trimbak Ráo delayed his appearance for ten days, and then rather blockaded than besieged the fortress. This blockade lasted for fifteen months, when it was terminated by the payment by Haidar of five lakhs of rupees and the renunciation of seven important districts on his northern frontier.

We now approach the time when our own countrymen first made acquaintance with this famous fortress. But to understand thoroughly how this acquaintance-ship began it will be necessary to describe, in the

briefest manner, the mode by which Haidar Ali dispossessed the ancient Hindú dynasty.

The curse of being born in the purple had been gradually falling upon the ruling family. Subsequently to the demise of Chick Déo Ráj in 1704 the administration of the country had been virtually conducted by the Dalwai, or hereditary Commander-in-Chief. The most famous of these, Dévaráj, administered the affairs of the country with vigour, and, on the whole, with fair success, till the year 1756 when he was supplanted rather than succeeded by his brother, Nanjanráj. This nobleman, who had for some time virtually commanded the army, had previously engaged the services of Haidar Naik, a soldier of fortune, who had shewn soldier-like conduct as a volunteer at the siege of Dévanáhali. The reputation of Haidar increasing daily Nanjanráj called upon him in 1756 to aid him in restoring order in the ranks of the army, then mutinying for want of pay. Haidar responded and came to Seringapatam, but no money being forthcoming for the purpose, Nanjanráj resigned his office in disgust. Haidar, aided by a confidential Hindú friend, Khandé Ráo, soon succeeded in settling the accounts of the army. Having effected this, Haidar, leaving Khandé Ráo to watch over his interests, and re-appointing Nanjanráj as minister, joined the army in the field. Very soon after this Nanjanráj was removed and was succeeded by Khandé Ráo, Haidar receiving as payment for his share in this transaction assignments of districts equal to more than half the territories of the State. Then very soon did the Hiadú nobility discover the mistake they had committed in thus

elevating Haidar. A plot was set on foot by the Queen dowager, Nanjanráj Urs, and Khandé Ráo, to get rid of him. For a moment it seemed likely to succeed. Attacked in the garden of the Darya-daolat Haidar swam the river and fled for his life. But the triumph of the conspirators was short. Levying fresh troops, Haidar attacked and defeated the army of Khandé Ráo at Nanjangód, then, marching to Gánjám, thence dictated terms to the helpless Rájá. From that time, June 1761, Haidar Ali was the real ruler of Mysore, the nominal title only being left to the Rájá and his successors, who remained under close surveillance in Seringapatam, till released by the events of the 4th May 1799. .

Haidar's first war with the English shewed the abilities he possessed as a soldier. Though not always successful he generally knew when to strike a decisive blow. Thus it happened in 1769, that taking advantage of the distance from Madras of the two main hostile armies, he made a raid at the head of 6,000 chosen horse to that city, and dictated peace under its walls to the Governor (29th March 1769). Then followed the disastrous campaign with the Márhátás beginning with the defeat of Chirkúlí and ending with the ransom of Seringapatam. After an interval, in the course of which he repulsed the troops of the Nizam and the Márhátás from his territories, Haidar entered upon his last war, famous for his defeat of the detachments of Colonel Baillie and Colonel Braithwaite, and the sanguinary and not altogether unequal contests which he maintained against Sir Eyre Coote at Porto Novo, Pírambákam, and Arní.

Haidar died immediately after the last named engagement (17th December 1781) but his death did not interrupt the war. It continued to linger under his son and successor, Tippú Sultán, till the month of March 1784.

But Tippú, though he then made peace with the English, did not cease to carry on warfare with his neighbours. The Nizam, the Márhátás, and the Coorgs, in turn occupied his troops. At last, he ventured to attack a protected ally of the English, the Rájá of Travankór. This was an insult which was not allowed to pass unnoticed ; and a new coalition of the English, the Nizam, and the Márhátás was formed to punish the disturber of the public peace.

The early part of this war was characterised by varying successes, but it was brought to an issue by the determination expressed by Lord Cornwallis to strike at the heart of his enemy's dominions. These views he at once attempted to carry out. Bangalore was taken on the 7th March 1791 ; its fort on the 21st ; Seringapatam itself was seen and threatened in May ; but, owing to the want of supplies, to sickness, and to the late season, it was not till the 5th February 1792 that the British army was able seriously to threaten the capital of the Sultan.

The story of the siege which then ensued has been told with perspicuity and force by one of the chief actors in the scene* from whose work I have already quoted. In many respects it was a memorable event, and though not conducted to the same forcible issue as that which

* Major Dirom then Deputy Adjutant-General of His Majesty's Forces in India.

followed it, it abounds with traits of gallantry and interest. Moreover it was successful.

Before however presenting an outline of this siege, it may be pertinent to glance for a moment at the position occupied by Tippú and his father in the estimation of the natives of India, for it was that estimation which gave them half their strength, and which endowed Seringapatam with a prestige exceeding that of any other great fortress in Hindostan.

At the time when Haidar Ali and Tippú flourished the leading native powers of India south of the Satlaj were the Márhátá confederacy, composed of the often disunited chiefs of Púna, of Baroda, of Indúr, of Nagpúr, of the country ruled by Sindia; the Nizam; and Mysore. For all practical purposes the others did not count. Now, of those I have enumerated, Madhají Sindia had shewn the greatest capacity and the most farsighted views. But Madhají, though dealing to the English in the western Presidency some very severe blows, had in the end been beaten; and at the time of the siege of Seringapatam by Lord Cornwallis he was endeavouring to bring about a general confederacy against us, which would have tried our resources to the utmost. But he was working quietly, in the dark, and the prestige of victory did not then sit on his brow. The other Márhátá powers, unprepared at the moment to follow the lead of Madhají, were then quiescent. The Nizam was our ally. It was the ruler of Mysore alone who had shewn himself at all equal to the English on the field of battle. It was Haidar who had dictated peace to us under the walls of Madras; it was Haidar

who had fought a not unequal battle with the General who had been the right hand of Clive at Plassey ; and, though Haidar was dead, his son lived, having inherited his love of power, his ambition, his lust of conquest. It was not yet known indeed how far inferior in ability, in judgment, in management of men, was Tippú to his sire. Men saw in him the ruler of the table-land which looked down upon the Carnatic, a land fruitful in warriors, strong in hill forts, well watered by its rivers, and whose island fortress dominated southern India. Seringapatam under its later Hindú sovereigns had never been aggressive; but under its two Mahomedan rulers the English in Madras had learned to speak of it with respect, whilst in Trichinápalí and in Madura, in Trevandrum and Kochin, its name was never mentioned but with awe. Madhájí Sindia had not been blind to the vast prestige exercised by the ruler of Mysore, and he had secretly pressed alike upon Tippú and the Nizam the desirability of abstaining from isolated warfare, of nursing their resources until he should be able to bring to their aid the vast power of an united Márhátá confederacy to combat the one enemy who would otherwise swallow them all up in detail,—the English. From what is known of Haidar's character it seems not improbable that he would have listened to the advice of the greatest of Indian Statesmen. But Tippú, besides lacking judgment, laboured under a misfortune still common in the world, and to be seen in all religions,—he was a bigot. He hated all infidels, whether Christian or Hindús. He would take counsel of none of them. Thus it was that he foolishly precipitated the contest,

not only isolated, but with his natural allies, the Nizam and the troops of the Peshwa, in league with his enemies. Tippú was beaten in the field ; but yet he had the satisfaction of witnessing the English retreat (May 1791) from Seringapatam. But when in February of the following year he saw them occupy the hill which crowns the opposite bank of the Káverí, and learned that they had seized the French Rocks, when too he counted in their ranks the cavalry of the Márhátás and the trained contingent of the Nizam, it is more than probable that he thought, and thought with regret, of the rejected advice of the chief of the house of Sindia.

Although the fortifications were greatly strengthened subsequently to 1792, the intelligent traveller will have no difficulty in following Lord Cornwallis' plan of attack upon the fortress. It must always be recollected that in the two sieges, those of 1792 and 1799, the main attack on Seringapatam was conducted each time from different sides. In the former year it was made from the north and east, in the latter from the west and northwest. Lord Cornwallis' first care was to clear the upper portion of the ground on the north bank of the river, where Tippú lay with his army computed to be 100,000 strong ; then, to effect a lodgment on the island itself. This plan he determined to carry out on the night of the 6th February. On that night and during the following day, Tippú's intrenched camp was stormed, the passage of the river was effected, the Lál Bágh and the village of Gánjám were occupied. By this success the English gained a strong position on the island to the east of the fortress.

The position of both parties on the morning of the 8th February may thus be described. Tippú held the fortress, the Daolat Bágh, and the works connecting the one with the other. His communications with the south and west were likewise open. The English on their side had cut off their enemy on the north and on the east, had invested the fortress on those sides, and had effected a secure lodgment on the island. But that was not all. Whilst dismay and despair reigned in the camp of Tippú, whilst his forced levies were deserting and his foreign hirelings were submitting, the English were full of the confidence which deserved success always inspires.

Tippú himself was so overcome by the disaster that he made overtures for peace. With that object in view, he released two of his prisoners, Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, and loading them with presents, sent them to the British camp with letters for Lord Cornwallis. The propositions contained in those letters were entertained ; but the negotiations which followed did not interfere with the vigorous prosecution of hostilities.

I have stated that the fortress had been invested on its northern and eastern sides. It had been originally intended that the main attack should issue from Gánjám, by making a lodgment in the Daolat Bágh. From thence regular approaches were to be run against the north-eastern angle of the fort, which would also be subjected to a strong enfilading fire from batteries on the northern bank of the river. But Colonel Ross, the Chief Engineer, having been able to reconnoitre the northern face of the fortress very closely, and having as-

certained that the curtain was very weak, extending close along the bank of the river, leaving no room for out-works ; that the flank defences were few and of little consequence ; having also received information corroborative of these views from some of the European deserters from Tippú, judged it more advisable to make the principal attack across the river against the northern face of the fort. Lord Cornwallis admitted the force of Colonel Ross's views. It may be interesting to record in this place the other advantages and the disadvantage which an attack on the northern face across the river offered to the view of Lord Cornwallis and his Chief Engineer. They are thus recorded by Major Dirom :—

“ The ditch,” writes that officer, “ excavated from the rock, was dry, and said to be inconsiderable ; and it appeared to be so from what could be observed in looking into it from the pagoda hill. The stone glacis, which, built into the river, covers that face, was broken, or had been left incomplete, in two places, including several hundred yards of the curtain ; the walls might therefore be breached to the bottom, and would probably fill up the greater part of the ditch.* The fort, built on the declivity of the island on the north was then exposed in its whole extent, and every shot fired from that quarter must take effect, while the slope of the island also to the west end exposed that part of the fort to a very powerful enfilade attack from the ground by which it is commanded on the south side of the river opposite to the south-west face of the fort.

* Many of these defects were remedied subsequently to 1792. Vids page 3.

"The north branch of the river, which would interfere between the main attack and the fort, was the only objection. It seemed possible, by repairing an old dam or embankment, to throw the water entirely into the other branch ; at all events, the channel, though rugged, was not deep or impassible, and the embarrassment of such an obstacle was in some measure compensated by the security it gave against sallies, and the cover it would afford in breaking ground at once within breaching distance of the fort. The fire, too, from that side, could not be very considerable, and there was a certainty of carrying on the approaches rapidly, and breaching the place with little loss."

For these reasons it was determined to attack Seringapatam on its northern face. The first preparations to carry out this plan were made on the 18th February. Two days prior to that date Lord Cornwallis' army was reinforced, on the northern bank of the Káverí, by the Bombay force under General Abercromby, consisting of 2,000 European, and 4,000 native troops, fit for duty.

On the following day, the 19th, a diversion was made to beat up the Mysore horse encamped on the south side of the river. Whilst the enemy were engaged, ineffectually, in meeting this attack, a detachment from the main body attacked and occupied a redoubt on the north bank of the river nearly opposite the middle of the fort on that side, at a distance from it of about 1,500 yards. This having been effected the north-west side of the fort was invested by the Bombay force. This force took up a position on a rising ground, just beyond gun-shot of the fort.

Tippú's personal activity and vigour at this point of the siege is thus described by Major Dirom : " He was " seen frequently every day on the ramparts, particu- " larly at the north face, viewing our approaches, and " giving directions to his own troops. He was con- " stantly bringing guns to the works and cavaliers on " that side, and had a multitude of people at work, " thickening the inner rampart, filling up the embras- " sures to strengthen the parapet where he could not " have guns, and repairing such as had been blown " and damaged by the firing of his cannon. He had " at first employed his people in completing the glacis " and strengthening the works on the east face of the " fort towards the island ; but since the opening of our " trenches towards the north side, all his attention " and exertions were directed to that quarter. He " was at work day and night, making every prepar- " ation possible for a vigorous defence."

But Tippú's affairs were drawing to a crisis. On the 22nd he attempted to dislodge the advanced picquets of the Bombay Army. The action, which lasted all day, was well fought on both sides, and it was only at nightfall that the Mysoreans gave up the contest. The ill success of this attack, added to the knowledge that 20,000 Márhátás, under Parse-ram Bháo, were advancing to invest the south side of his fortress, and thus to blockade him entirely, at last decided him. On the 23rd February he accepted in principle the terms offered him by Lord Cornwallis. Hostilities were then suspended, and though nearly breaking out again in consequence of the unwillingness of the defeated Sultán to resign Coorg, they

came on that date actually to an end. The treaty, by which Tippú agreed to pay three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees and to cede about one-half of his territories, was signed on the 19th March.

Peace then came to Tippú, but it was a peace dictated by despair. His whole soul was bent upon a renewal of the struggle under more favourable circumstances. With this object in view, and noting the reason which had prompted the allies to attack the north side of the fort, he greatly strengthened that face. In fact by the new works, by the double ramparts and double ditches which he added to the northern and western faces, he made of Scringapatam as it were a fortress within a fortress,—a fact with which, strangely enough, the English only became acquainted on the day of the storm.

Nor did he neglect the eastern and southern faces. The double ramparts and double ditches he added on the sides may yet be easily traced. But he constructed, in addition a new line of intrenchments from the Daolat Bágh to the Periapatám bridge (close to the village of Pakhshwán) within 6 or 700 yards of the fortress. Whilst carrying on these military works he instituted quasi-reforms; but these consisted mainly in the substitution of confiscation for a regular system of revenue. The titular Rájá having died he plundered his palace, and appointed no successor.

But the chief end on which his aims were bent was to obtain allies. He could scarcely hope for these in India. The man who would have cemented a general alliance of the native powers against the English, Madhají Sindia, died in 1794; and after his death the

policy of isolated action became the policy of the native chiefs. Now, both the Peshwa and the Nizam had benefited so largely by the war of 1791/2 at Tippú's expense that he felt it was useless to try to gain them. Failing then the princes of India he had recourse to Afghanistan. In 1797 he despatched an embassy to Zemán Sháh Abdálí, ruler of that country, proposing an alliance between that prince and the Mahomedan powers of India to drive out the English and the Brahmins. Zemán Sháh, however, perhaps could not, certainly did not, respond, and it seems possible that but for the rays of hope disseminated by the French Revolution, Tippú would, after this failure, have resigned himself to his fate.

Strange indeed in appearance, that that mighty upheaving of all the old ways in France, an upheaving which cast down thrones, and levelled its shafts specially at kings, should have found its first sympathiser in the sovereign of Seringapatam ! Yet, after all, in reality, not so very strange. It had been a favourite maxim of Haidar, familiar to Tippú from his earliest youth, that the Europeans could only be conquered by Europeans. In his eyes, then, the French Revolution was only an event which placed France in antagonism with combined Europe ; which, as her armies gained strength, defeated coalition after coalition, and, finally, in 1797, triumphed over every country except the one he hated most, inspired him with the hope that by her aid he might yet realize the dream akin to that for which Dupleix had schemed, and Bussy and Lally had fought in vain.

Adventurers fleeing to his court from Pondichéry captured by the English fanned these visions ; but it was an accident that ripened them to action. In the early part of 1797 a French privateer, commanded by an adventurer named Ripaud, was driven on the coast near Mangalore. This man, finding his way to Serin-gapatam, succeeded in persuading Tippú that he was an envoy to him from the French republic. He established in Seringapatam a branch of the Jacobin Club, composed mainly of the refugees from Pondichéry ; and this Club, constituting itself an integral portion of the French nation, and swearing hatred to all kings excepting to "Tippú Sultán the victorious" persuaded the infatuated Sovereign, against the advice of his ablest counsellors, to send an embassy to the Isle of France and to the Directory, to demand aid for the expulsion of the English from India.

Tippú's ambassadors reached indeed the Isle of France, but the number of men whom they persuaded to embark in their perilous enterprise did not exceed* seventy-six Europeans and twenty-six Mulattos.

It happened, too, unfortunately for Tippú, that the

[†] They were

- One General,
- One Naval Captain,
- One Colonel,
- Two Artillery Officers,
- Six Naval Officers,
- Four Ship Carpenters,
- Twenty-six Officers, Sergeants and Interpreters,
- Thirty-six European soldiers,
- Twenty-six Mulatto soldiers.

Governor of the Isle of France, General Malartic, had made no secret of the request which the Mysore ambassadors had preferred. He had even issued a proclamation, dated 30th January 1798, in which he invited the people of the island to rally to the Sultán's standard. A copy of this proclamation found its way to Calcutta, was published in the newspapers, and attracted the attention of the Governor-General, Marquess Wellesley* (18th June 1798). The Governor-General was well acquainted with the previous endeavours of Tippú to obtain allies; with the fact that he had strengthened the fortifications of Serin-gapatam; and was only waiting an opportunity to retrieve the misfortunes of 1792. The proclamation of General Malartic not only confirmed his information on these points, but gave him an opportunity for calling Tippú to account; nor was the necessity for such action lessened in the eyes of the English ruler by the interception of a letter addressed by General Bonaparte to Tippú from his Head Quarters in Cairo, informing the Mysore Sultán that he had arrived on the shores of the Red Sea with a numerous and invincible army, full of desire to free him from the English yoke, and desiring him to send to Suez an intelligent person in whom he had confidence to confer with him.†

The Governor-General remonstrated with Tippú. Tippú, (8th November 1798), as yet unprepared for

* Then known as Earl of Mornington.

† This letter, dated 7th Pluviose of the 7th year of the Republic, is attached as a piece justificative to Michaud's history of Mysore.

war, tried to cajole the Governor-General. (25th December 1798). The Governor-General then unfolded to Tippú his knowledge of all his proceedings and asked him to furnish security for peaceable behaviour, giving him but one day to consider his reply, and warning him that delay would be dangerous. Tippú delayed not a day, but upwards of a month, and then gave a vague and unsatisfactory, and, as Marquess Wellesley deemed, a contemptuous reply. The Governor-General hesitated no longer, but at once directed the British Army, under Major-General Harris, to march into the territories of the Sultán to enforce the necessary security.

Thus began the last war with Tippú Sultán. The reader, while he cannot fail to see how entirely Tippú brought it on himself, cannot the less refuse his homage to the foresight and decision of the great Marquess, who thus gave evidence of a knowledge of the time to strike in politics, not less remarkable than that invariably displayed by his illustrious brother on the field of battle.

The plan of the English was to attack Mysore on two sides; viz., from Vellore by an army under the command of General Harris, aided by a contingent furnished by the Nizam; and from Cannanór under General Stuart, advancing by way of Coorg. To these two armies, numbering upwards of 43,000 men,* Tippú

* LORD HARRIS' ARMY.
Europeans.

Cavalry.....	884
Artillery	608
Infantry	4,381
	5,873
	5

had to oppose an army as yet not assembled, and the uncertain hope of aid from France. But though not confident, he did not despair. Hastily assembling his troops, he threw garrisons into the most important places, and then set out, at the end of February 1799, for Periapatám, at the head of about 60,000 men, with the hope of surprising and beating in detail the Bombay army which he was aware was marching by way of Coorg. Tippú's manœuvres against the British army were skilful and seemed at first to promise success. Aided by a fog, he (5th March 1799) succeeded in cutting off their advanced brigade from their main body ; but the valour of the British supplied the deficiencies of their tactics, and after a conflict of several hours the Mysoreans were repulsed. Leaving then a small party to check if possible, or at least to harass, the Bombay Army, Tippú hastened from Periapatám with the main body of his troops to oppose General Harris, who, he was informed, had crossed the Mysore frontier. He found him on the 27th March taking up a position at Mala-

Natives.

Cavalry.....	1,751
Infantry.....	10,695
Gun Lascars	1,483
Pioneers.....	1,000
	14,929
Subsidiary Force officered by British Officers furnished by the Nizam	10,157
Nizam's Native Force	6,000
	36,959
Bombay Army..	6,420
Total..	<u>43,379</u>

vali, about forty miles from Seringapatam and fifteen from Madúr. He at once determined to attack him, and opening immediately upon his advanced posts, he followed up the fire by a charge of 15,000 horse. But the shock of the Mysore Cavalry, impetuous as it was, could not prevail against the steady discipline of European Infantry supported by a murderous fire of artillery. After an hour's combat, in which they lost 1,000 men, the Mysoreans were finally repulsed. Tippú retreated in all haste on Seringapatam, ravaging the country behind him, so as to render the advance of the English, who depended for their supplies on the country through which they marched, difficult if not impossible. On the 30th March a portion of his infantry and artillery, including his French auxiliaries, and numbering altogether about 8,000 men, entered Seringapatam. His cavalry and the remaining infantry were left on the north bank of the Káverí, as well to harass the English force, as to constitute a disposable army upon which to fall back in case of need.

Meanwhile General Harris detecting the object of Tippú in ravaging the country, had resolved to outwit him, and by crossing the Káverí at a point below Seringapatam, to march through a well cultivated tract, as yet undevastated. Instead of following Tippú in his retreat and of pursuing the route taken by Lord Cornwallis in 1791-2, he marched in a south-westerly direction to Sosilla, about a mile above the junction of the Káverí and Kabaní, crossed the former river there, and marching without interruption by the south bank, took up, on the 5th April, the positions to the west and north-west of the fortress, which

had been partly occupied by the Bombay army under General Abercromby in 1792. Eleven days later he was joined by General Stewart, to whom he assigned a position to the north by west of the fortress.

The second siege of Seringapatam differed in this respect from the first in that in the interval which had elapsed between the two the British Government had discovered that Tippú was a man who would hold no engagement as sacred. In dealing with him, therefore, Marquess Wellesley was animated by feelings very similar to those which animated the counsels of the allied sovereigns when in 1813-14 they had to treat with Napoléon. Both alike felt that a treaty would have been but a truce, binding only so long as the enemy should not consider it to his advantage to break it. The policy of humbling Tippú by depriving him of one-half of his territories had been tried. It had failed, because the outlying portions of his dominions having been lopped off, his power had become more concentrated, his hatred more intensified. In a crisis of the world's history, when no obstacle seemed able to bar the advance of daring genius, it was necessary for the safety of the British interests in India, that the one sovereign who hated those interests, and who had himself seen what his troops, led by his father, could accomplish, should be rendered, as far as possible, harmless for evil. Hence it was, that when in the course of the second siege, Tippú sued for peace, terms were designedly offered him, which he could not accept without signing at once the abdication of the position he had inherit-

ed and the renunciation of the power ever to recover it.*

General Harris, after consultation with his engineers, determined to attack the fortress on its north-western angle, breaching the western side. The fortress had indeed been here considerably strengthened, but it was still its weakest point. The curtain, nearly five hundred toises in length, was armed by only three pieces of cannon ; the river besides, for five months of the year, was fordable the whole length of it. The plan being settled, the operations began at once. General Harris with the main body was to attack the place at the angle caused by the junction of the northern with the western face, whilst the Bombay division should take up a position in continuation of the line formed by Lord Harris which should bring it opposite the northern side of the angle with a view to direct an enfilading fire on the defences, and thus to diminish the opposition to the main attack.

On the 20th April the fire opened from the northern attack. This was followed up by the successful dislodgment of the enemy from a position four hundred yards ~~in~~ advance of his other field works, a success which enabled the besiegers to establish, in the course of the night, a parallel at a distance of 780 yards from the fortress, and 440 from the enemy's intrenchments still remaining outside it.

* These terms were : the cession of half of his dominions ; the payment of the expenses of the war ; the delivery of two of his sons as hostages ; and the surrender of Seringapatam into the hands of the English till the conclusion of a definitive peace. To these terms, to consider which only twenty-four hours were given him, Tippú did not deign a reply.

Alarmed at this, and at indications which he noticed of erecting another battery on the northern bank, Tippú, on the 22nd, directed a vigorous sally to be made against our positions on that bank. This sally was well planned, and the troops who conducted it, led by Tippú's corps of Frenchmen, behaved with great spirit, penetrating the English intrenchments, but it was finally repulsed with the loss of 700 men.

On the 23rd, the fire from both attacks silenced the enemy's guns, the enfilading fire from the northern bank rendering it impossible for the Mysoreans to defend the curtains.

On the 26th, the approaches meanwhile having steadily advanced, the English, led by Colonel Wellesley, dislodged the enemy from their last remaining entrenchment. This was 380 yards in front of the fort on its western face, covered on its right by a redoubt, and on the left by a small circular work open to the rear. The intrenchment was indeed carried, but as the enemy with great gallantry still held the circular work which enfiladed it, it was extremely difficult for the English to maintain their position. It became necessary then to drive the enemy from the circular work, and from some ruins near it. This was accomplished on the 27th, under a heavy fire from the walls of the fort.

The Sultán, now driven to depend on the defence offered by the fortress itself, again expressed a willingness to treat. But the conditions offered were such that he felt he could not accept without degradation. Again there is forced upon us the similarity of his position to that of Napoléon in 1814, and again do we

see the same passions bringing about similar results.* He resolved to resist to the bitter end.

Meanwhile day by day the parallels approached nearer, until on the 3rd May the breach on the western side of the angle was reported practicable. The previous night the river had been forded by Lieutenant Lalor. He had ascertained that the descent into the ditch from the retaining wall of the counterscarp was only seven feet; that the ditch was fordable; that the rubbish of the rampart and fausse braye formed an irregular but continued slope from the ditch to the summit of the rampart; and that it would be only necessary to provide means to accompany the assault for the descent from the counterscarp into the ditch. It was determined then, the breach having been reported practicable on the 3rd, to assault on the morning of the 4th. Early on the morning of that day, Major-General Baird, who himself had been nearly four years a prisoner in Seringapatam, issued his orders for the assault. He directed Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop with six companies of Bombay European flankers, supported by H. M.'s 12th, and 33rd regiments, ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers and fifty artillery men, to assault the north rampart and to push on with the European flank companies until he should meet the south attack under Colonel Sherbrook consisting of the flank companies of the

* "If," says Alison, "sound political judgment may perhaps condemn the pride which made him so obstinately refuse the conditions offered to him at Chatillon, and throw all, even in that extremity, upon the hazard of war; yet it must be admitted that there was something magnanimous in his resolution to run every hazard rather than to sit down on a degraded throne."—*History of Europe*.

Scotch brigade and the regiment de Meuron, reinforced by the grenadier companies of H. M.'s 73rd and 74th regiments.*

It was not till 1 o'clock in the afternoon that General Baird stepping from the trenches sword in hand called upon his men to advance. In a moment the storming columns sprang up, dashed into the river, and crossed it under a heavy fire of musketry. In six minutes the forlorn hope, followed by the main body, had gained the summit of the breach and planted the British standard on the rampart. But the breach had scarcely been gained when they found themselves confronted by an inner rampart lined with troops, separated from them by a wide and deep ditch and defended at its angle by a high cavalier. Unable to storm this, yet determined to penetrate by some means into the interior, they ran along the ramparts, some to the left, some to the right. We will leave them thus running to follow the fortunes of Tippú Sultán on this eventful day.

Tippú, during the siege, had more than once shewn to his followers that he despaired of the result. Instead of striving to inspire them with courage, he, with the bigotry which had become habitual to him, had had constant recourse to astrologers and priests. On the day of the assault he was distinctly warned by his ablest General, Said Ghafir, that he would be attacked that day. Not only did

* The storming party consisted of 2,494 Europeans and 1,882 natives, composed of H. M.'s 12th, 33rd, and 74th Regiments, ten Companies Bengal Sepoys, eight Companies Madras Sepoys, one hundred Artillery men and a proportion of gun Lancers.—*Sir D. Baird's Report.*

he refuse to believe it, but he permitted one of his youthful flatterers to summon the men from their positions in the traverses and on the ramparts to receive their pay at midday. They were in the act of receiving it when the assault was delivered. Said Ghafir was hurrying to the Sultán to remonstrate against this act of folly, when, turning aside for a moment to issue orders for the severance of the slight connexion which did exist between the outer and the inner rampart, he was killed. Tippú was about to sit down to his midday meal when this intelligence reached him. Though greatly agitated, he still continued his meal, and was engaged at it, when he was informed that the assault was actually being made. He hastened at once along the northern rampart towards the breach, on nearing which he fired seven or eight shots at the stormers, killing two or three. Finding, however, that his people were falling about him, and that the stormers were advancing, he ran back along the rampart until, from the outside, he reached the sally-port whence the way was open to him to join his cavalry on the other side of the river. But he disdained to flee. Believing that the inner fort was still secure, and that from its ramparts he might yet be able to drive back the foe, he mounted his horse and endeavoured to force his way through the sally-port, the direct road into the interior fortifications. But before he could reach that gateway it had become choked with fugitives fleeing from the English soldiers who had managed to penetrate the inner fort in the mode to be related immediately. The Sultán, however, who had already been twice slightly wounded, still endea-

voured to press his way, when his horse was shot under him, and almost immediately afterwards he received a third wound, severe though not fatal. His attendants then placed him in a palanquin. But as it was impossible in the crowd and tumult to move this conveyance, Tippú would appear to have left it and to have crawled towards a gateway* at a little distance, leading into a garden. Here he was attacked by some English soldiers. One of his attendants then proposed that he should save his life by disclosing his rank. But this Tippú refused to do, and when an English soldier attempted to seize his sword belt, Tippú though nearly fainting from his wounds, made a cut at him with his sword. The soldier at once shot him dead. His body remained undiscovered for several hours.

To account for the manner in which the English had succeeded in entering the inner fort it is necessary to retrace our steps. It would appear that a party of the stormers who had reached the outer rampart after those in advance had run along it to the right and left, finding that the enemy on the inner rampart had followed the movements of the assailants, deserting the position nearly opposite the breach, endeavoured to find some means by which they could penetrate into those inner fortifications. It happened fortunately for them that a temporary platform about one foot in width,† in the endeavour to remove which Said Ghafir had been killed, still remained. Narrow, having a great depth below it, and of some length, the crossing it was so hazardous that the following day, in cold blood, not

* This gateway was afterwards destroyed.—*Lord Valentia.*

† Some call it a wall.

a man would venture to attempt it.* But in the excitement of that memorable 4th May there was no hesitation. In single file the men crossed over, and it was these men who, running across these inner lines, were able to meet on the other side the fugitives who, with Tippú amongst them, were endeavouring to enter the place which they deemed their last refuge.

From that moment the fighting was over. The carnage, though considerable, was much less than might have been expected in a city taken by storm, especially when the stormers knew, as many of the stormers on this occasion did know, that about ten days before, the English soldiers who had been taken prisoners in different actions before the siege had been put to death in the most barbarous manner, by having nails driven through their skulls.† The French contingent surrendered at discretion. The two elder sons present of Tippú, ignorant of their father's death, shewed a manly resignation to their fate. The houses of the chief Sirdars as well as those of the merchants and bankers were generally pillaged. But the palace was secured and the wealth it contained reserved as booty for the army at large.

Such was the capture of Seringapatam, carrying with it the fall of the dynasty of the Mahomedan adventurer Haidar Ali. How the old dynasty was restored, and how with that restoration the name of Mysore became connected with peace and industry instead of, as theretofore, with rapine and aggression, it is no part of my task to relate. But I have not yet done with

* Valentia.

† General Baird's Report.

Seringapatam. The interest it had excited did not perish with Tippú. Indeed within the short space of ten years it was destined to revive in a manner more exciting, more startling, and more original than at any previous period.

But before I refer to that last exciting passage in the history of the fortress, I think I shall be justified in suggesting for the tourist of the present day, whilst the story of the storming is still fresh in his recollection, some hints which will enable him without the aid of a *cicerone* to recognize the most interesting points of the fortress.

I will suppose then that the traveller is starting from Mysore. Driving through the villages of Kaláswári, Sultánpéét, and Pakshwán, he finds himself suddenly, at a turn of the road, facing the western side of the fortress, the breach distinctly visible at its northernmost end. Descending from his carriage he walks along the nullah which there joins on to the branch of the river known in olden days as ‘the little Káverí’ until he finds himself nearly opposite the breach. Descending then towards the bed of the river, he sees two guns planted in the ground. These represent the advanced parallels from which General Baird issued on the memorable 4th May to storm the fortress.

The view from this point is striking and impressive. The traveller sees what General Harris, General Baird, and Colonel Wellesley saw on that famous morning. The fortress stands now, its guns and defenders excepted, as it stood then. There is the battered fausse-braye and the breached rampart; the ruined cavalier giving no signs of the second rampart below the level

of, and separated by a deep ditch from, the rampart which was visible. To the left, the enfilading position taken up by the Bombay forces, a position which manifestly must paralyse the defence against the direct attack. All is unchanged. As I write these lines, 8th February 1876, the Káverí is as fordable as it was on the 4th May 1799. There are the stage, the scenery, the footlights : the actors only are absent.

The traveller returns to his carriage, and drives on till he finds himself in front of the southern face of the fortress. Here he enters by a gateway made by the English.* The road he should take runs only through a part of the town, along the southern and western face of the palace of the Sultán. Passing these, he should leave the road and drive direct to the north-west angle. Alighting then from the carriage, he ascends the rampart, and walks about a hundred yards till he reaches the angle. A turn to the left is then made, and, in a few moments he stands on the summit of the breach. From this point he views the scene as it

* The road has been made to deviate from the old gateway, called the Elephant gateway, erected by Tippú Sultán in 1793. This still retains an inscription of which the following is the purport :—“ In the name of God the merciful and gracious. In the year 1209, commencing from the birth of Mahomed, on Tuesday the 9th Khusrave, the Emperor began the construction of the Fort, when the star Jupiter was in its full influence.

“ During the commencement of the construction the rainbow was shining over the air, whilst the stars Mercury (and others) were in good conjunction with each other. The influence of these stars decide, by the grace of God, that this Fort will ever remain permanent, exempted from every kind of misfortune.”

The date noted corresponds to our year 1793 when the fortress was greatly strengthened.

I may observe that the traveller ought most certainly to alight from his carriage, and pass through this gateway. One glance makes the situation clear to him. On the other side of the gateway he sees the old Hindú fort of Seringapatam ; with the gateway begin the enormous works which made it a fortress within a fortress.

presented itself to the defenders on the 4th May 1799. In the distance he can see the village of Pálhali, and by the aid of the plan B attached to this sketch the position of the English becomes clear to him.

At first there are many things to astonish, even to puzzle him. He can comprehend the weakness in one sense of the defensive position, attacked from the west, and that attack aided by a very heavy flanking fire from the north. He can comprehend how our men without difficulty climbed over the shattered fausse-braye, and crossed the ditch, but how they clambered up the parapet surprises him. It is true that a man, unencumbered, can now, though not easily, make the ascent ; but carrying his musket and ammunition, it would not only be not an easy, but a very difficult task. Yet the forlorn hope of the storming party stood upon that rampart six minutes after they had leaped out of the advanced trenches ! The whole world does not present a nobler monument of pluck and daring than does that shattered parapet. And though it may be urged that the enfilading fire from the north had cleared the angle of the rampart of its defenders, yet if the traveller turns round he will see the cavalier, *then* defended by a second rampart, and that rampart lined with troops, who, had they been but cool and steady, could have picked off our stormers, as almost singly and breathless, they mounted the breach. Well may the traveller be struck with awe ! Well, may he draw in his breath with a feeling of pride and veneration for the race that preceded him ! No more daring deed has been recorded in the world's history than that the scene of which he then contemplates.

But he supposes our attacking soldiers now on the rampart. Let him imagine their surprise when they discovered on reaching the spot which, they had been led to believe, would place the fortress at their mercy, that they were as far from that result as before. Facing them was a second fortress, covered by a rampart and a deep ditch, protected at this point by a heavily armed cavalier. It is true that of all these defences the ruined cavalier alone remains. But having read all that has been written on the subject, having made personal and repeated enquiries on the spot, having thoroughly examined the ground, and having had the good fortune to be assisted in my research by many capable officers in the active branch of the service, I shall be able, I trust, to make clear a matter which, in consequence of the alterations made in the fortress subsequent to the year 1799, has mystified many.

The traveller, when crossing the green plot which lies between the western wall of the Sultán's palace and the north-western angle of the fortress will have observed, all along the northern face several yards in rear of the rampart, a line of tamarind trees. Now I have ascertained that these tamarind trees were planted in the year 1800, on the alignment formed by the inner ditch and rampart. Lord Valentia who visited Seringapatam shortly after the siege (1802) writes then that the inner ditch and ramparts had been totally destroyed. He speaks of the young trees springing up behind the outer ramparts. A very old man, verging upon 100 years, interrogated by Captain Malet and myself in 1874, assured us of the fact of the

planting of the tamarind trees in 1800, the English, he said, having first destroyed the rampart and filled in the ditch which previously existed along the alignment. Granting this, the isolated position of our soldiers on their gaining the outer rampart becomes clear.* If the enemy had been cool and resolute, and if the slight communication between the two ramparts had been severed, as Said Ghafir had intended, they had really gained nothing but certain destruction. We can understand now, what would have been difficult to comprehend before, why Tippú should have endeavoured to force his way into the inner fortress rather than to join his cavalry in the field. For he deemed himself, once within its walls, to be doubly safe. He would have entered, and he would still have repulsed our men, but for that solitary wall or plank of communication between the two ramparts, a wall or plank so narrow that the same men who crossed it on the 4th May, "were afraid, on the following day, when their blood was cool, to re-cross it."†

When the traveller has had time to take in the whole of the events of the few minutes which followed the storming of the outer rampart, he should drive towards the sally-port on the northern face of the fortress. It will be recollectcd that Tippú reached this sally-port before our troops reached it, and by it he might easily have escaped, as the river was fordable, and his cavalry were on the opposite bank. All

* The soundness of the argument above is further proved by an inspection of the copy of the French plan B, executed in 1801, which accompanies this sketch.

† Lord Valentia's Travels, Vol 1, page 374.

the English accounts* confirm this statement. He might have escaped had he wished to escape. This cannot fail to be clear to the traveller who will recollect that Tippú reached that gate from the outside before our soldiers reached it from the outside, that the gate itself led into the inner fort. Instead, however, of escaping he tried to make his way within. But there he was met by the British soldiers, who, entering by the narrow wall, had traversed the chord, whilst he had been trying to penetrate by the outer arc, of the circle.

The arch to which Tippú dragged himself, after having been thrice wounded, only to meet his death, has been destroyed, but a wooden door leading into a garden, about a hundred yards to the right of the sally port, is indicated as the spot where the unknown British soldier extorted blood for blood.

Retracing his steps, or possibly taking it en route, the traveller, coming from the famous north-west angle, is shewn an underground vault in the outer rampart which is stated to have served as one of the prisons in which some of the European soldiers were confined. Probably the story is true. The oldest natives state it to have been so, and one man even asserted to me that in this place the prisoners were murdered ten days before the assault. The vault is bomb-proof, and there are many purposes for which it might have been used.

When I first visited Seringapatam, and subsequently, this vault was always indicated as the prison

* Vide Buchanan,
Valentia,
Asiatic Annual Register and others.

in which Sir David Baird had been confined. But this is certainly not the case. In his memoirs* Sir David Baird has left an exact plan of his prison. With this plan in our hand, Captain Malet and I spent two days in endeavouring to find the building. At last we succeeded. It is one of the mud houses, now in ruins, which were erected on the prolongation towards the inner rampart of the walls of the Sultán's palace.

Immediately after passing the vault just alluded to the traveller finds himself facing the enclosure in which still stands the famous temple of Sri Ranga, long since abandoned. There also he sees the wall which once enclosed the palace of the Hindú Rájás, demolished in 1800, in order to build with the materials a new palace at Mysore. The enclosure was converted after the siege into a manufactory of gun carriages. It is now a heap of ruins.

On the other side of the road which leads to the north-west angle are the walls which once enclosed the palaces of Haidar and of Tippú. Not a vestige of either remains; but the place is now used as a dépôt for sandalwood. The minarets and the immensely strong fortifications on the eastern face speak for themselves. The town is poor, dirty, and uninteresting. Its splendid houses have disappeared. Amongst the sights shewn to travellers is a *mamelon* upon which rises a flagstaff placed there by Colonel Wellesley's orders; and an ingenious bridge, built by Captain de Havilland, which illustrates Lord Palmerston's motto, '*flecti non frangi.*'

There are two other buildings, connected with the dynasty of Haidar, which it is impossible that the traveller should leave unexplored. These are the palace and garden called *Darya-daolat*, and the *Lil Bâgh* containing the mausoleum of Haidar Ali and of Tippú Sultán.

The palace of the *Darya-daolat* was simply the country house of the Sultán whither he was wont to repair for recreation. But he never slept in it. At sunset he used to return to the fortress. The palace is a good illustration of the Indian ornamental style. The walls on one side exhibit in grotesque paintings the victory gained by Haidar and Tippú over Colonel Baillie in 1780 ; those on the other are apparently intended to pourtray the various phases in the life of a Mahomedan gentleman of rank. The house is ornamented throughout with a paper covered with false gilding,* the effect of which is extremely good. The house and garden are kept up by the Mysore Government.

Colonel Wellesley occupied the house in 1800-1. It was visited by the Marquis of Dalhousie in 1855, upon which occasion that nobleman recorded a striking minute regarding it and the mausoleum of Haidar Ali and of Tippú.† Not only for the reasons urged by Lord Dalhousie, but as the specimen of a building unique of its kind, and as the only place of rest for the traveller who may visit the famous fortress, its maintenance would seem desirable.

* Vide Buchanan, who gives a recipe for its preparation.

† Vide Appendix.

Driving from the Darya-daolat through the village of Gánjám, to the east end of the island, the traveller reaches the Lál Bágh ;—no longer the beautiful garden painted in enthusiastic terms by Major Dirom,—but famed as containing within its borders the mausoleum of Haidar Ali, of Tippú, and of the wife of the former. The building would disappoint those who might hope to witness a renewal of the glories of the Taj Mahal, for though the foundation is stone the upper portion is stucco. Still it is in many respects worthy of a visit. Its pillars of black marble, its doors of rosewood inlaid with ivory, the magnificent shawls over the tombs* form in themselves objects of real beauty. Nor can be witnessed without feeling the reverence still displayed by pious Mahomedans towards the memory of one, who, though he might not deserve the epithet of martyr applied to him by his adherents, was still the champion of their cause and faith in Southern India, and who died fighting, as he believed, for both.

Of the other objects which call for attention are Colonel Baillie's tomb, erected by his nephew in 1816, Colonel Baillie having died a prisoner in 1782; an insignificant obelisk erected to the memory of the officers of the 12th and 74th regiments who perished in the siege of 1799; the tombs at Pálhali of others who fell in that year; the burial ground of the garrison after the occupation of the fortress in 1799; and Colonel Scott's bungalow on the banks of the Káverí.

* A present from the prince well known in Calcutta as the "last surviving son of Tippú Sultán," Prince Ghulám Mahomed. He died in 1872.

This bungalow derives its notoriety from the following circumstance : Colonel Scott was placed in charge of the gun carriage manufactory in the Fort in 1800, and afterwards commanded the garrison. He is mentioned by Lord Valentia in 1801 as Captain Scott who had just exerted himself "with the highest credit" to establish that manufactory. It would appear that the Rájá of Mysore built for him a bungalow in an extremely pretty locality on the banks of the river about a quarter of a mile from the elephant gate. The loss of his wife and children in this spot in 1817 caused him, however, suddenly to quit it, to resign his appointment, and to return to England, leaving all his furniture standing in the house. The curious part of the story remains to be told. The late Máhárájá of Mysore, hearing of this sad occurrence, directed that the house should for ever remain in *statu quo*; that none of the furniture should be removed. And so in fact it has remained. The traveller who may visit it will see the beds with their torn and antiquated mosquito curtains; the carpets crumbling with age; two voiceless pianos; the tables and chairs of a bygone era.

To return to the fortunes of Seringapatam. Occupied by a garrison of combined British and native troops the fortress almost immediately lost its warlike character. In a few years it was found practicable to withdraw all the European Infantry but two weak companies of the 80th regiment, numbering 100 men, thus leaving the place to be garrisoned by two native regiments, and between two and three hundred European artillery men.

It happened, however, in 1809, that a foolish ruling of the Court of Directors, and the still more foolish and tyrannical proceedings* of Sir George Barlow, then Governor of Madras, had produced a general feeling of strong indignation amongst the officers of the coast army. They convened committees in all the principal stations in the Presidency, and universally or all but universally resolved to oppose the execution of the obnoxious orders, if necessary by force. This determination to resist was not less strong amongst the officers of the Company's Army stationed in the Mysore province than elsewhere. It shewed itself first at Seringapatam where Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, of the Artillery, was still in command. He was one of the officers whose removal had been directed by Sir George Barlow for having signed a paper expressive of his sympathy with the Deputy Adjutant-General, who had himself just been suspended for executing the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, General Macdowall. Colonel Bell and the officers of the Seringapatam garrison manifested their feeling so openly, that at the end of July, the Honourable Mr. Cole, then Assist-

* Amongst these proceedings may be enumerated :—

- 1.—The depriving the Commander-in-Chief of a seat in Council.
- 2.—The transfer of all important commands to Officers of the Royal army.
- 3.—The abolition of the Tent Contract.
- 4.—The suspension of Captain Bowles, Dy. Adjutant-General for carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
- 5.—The suspension of Colonel St. Leger, Major de Morgan, and Captains Marshall and Grant ; the removal of Colonels Bell, Chalmers, Cuppage, and Captain Coombs ; the supersession of Majors Kentsberry, Muirhead, Haslewood, and of Captain Smith ; for expressing sympathy with Captain Bowles.
- 6.—The issue of instructions by the Government requiring all their officers to sign a test-pledge engaging themselves to support the measures of Government under penalty of being sent from their Regiments, and “interned” in stations on the coast.

ant Resident, reported to Government that any attempt on their part to enforce their orders would be met by open revolt, and that the feeling was universal amongst the officers of the province.

But before this despatch could reach the Madras Government, the first blow had been struck. On the 29th July the garrison took forcible possession of the collector's treasury in Seringapatam. They likewise placed under restraint, and in a few days later expelled from the fort, the hundred men of the 80th regiment, who had remained there on duty.

Upon these overt acts of violence becoming known to Mr. Cole, he, acting in unison with Púrnia, the Dewán of the Rájá of Mysore,—a man who after having faithfully served Hajdar Ali and Tippú, had transferred his allegiance and his fidelity to the Hindú dynasty,—at once took measures for surrounding the island to prevent the ingress of supplies of any sort.

Colonel Bell met this measure by stationing guards on the mainland to ensure the transmission of whatever supplies might be needed; and, learning that a treasure escort would pass near the fort on the night of the 1st August, he even detached a company of native infantry to seize the treasure* and bring it within the fort, a feat which was successfully accomplished.

This daring measure, accompanied by the stoppage of the post, and the rumour of the preparation of a battering train, led Mr. Cole to fear that the mutineers might march on Mysore, where he would have had to

rely solely upon the native troops of the Rájá. The only troops in the neighbourhood upon whom dependance could be placed were a detachment of the 25th Light Dragoons and 59th Foot. But these were at Mandia, fifteen miles to the north of Seringapatam.

Whilst this was the state of affairs in the Mysore territory the Government of Madras had, by timely offers of pardon, persuaded the officers at the Mount to sign the test, and to return to their duty. Similar offers of forgiveness had been likewise expedited by the hands of Colonel Davies, commanding in Mysore, to the garrison of Seringapatam. But Davies on reaching the place had been at once placed in confinement, and when released after a few hours' detention, had been dismissed without a reply. Colonel Bell and the officers acting with him intended, indeed, no reply unless the obnoxious orders should be withdrawn and the suspended officers reinstated. On the 2nd August they "annexed" the Paymaster's treasure, amounting to about 45,000 rupees, and on the night of the same day they detached 500 men with guns to meet and escort two native corps which they had summoned from the fort of Chittledrúg to reinforce the garrison.

Intelligence of these proceedings having reached Mr. Cole he at once despatched 1,000 of the Mysore Horse to hover about and harass the enemy's detachment, by cutting off their supplies, though avoiding as far as possible any overt act of violence. At the same time he despatched messengers on the Bangalore road to expedite the march of the European troops summoned from that station, and expected to reach the vicinity of Seringapatam on the 4th August.

Matters were protracted for some days by the refusal of Colonel Gibbs commanding at Bangalore to allow the European troops to leave the station without an express order from the Government of Fort St. George ; and by the delay in the march of the two native corps from Chittledrúg.

However annoyed Mr. Cole may have been by what he considered the backwardness of Colonel Gibbs, he was sensibly relieved by the receipt on the evening of the 5th August of a letter from Colonel Bell which betrayed evidence of a desire to come to terms. Mr. Cole took it upon himself once again to offer oblivion of the past on the condition that the officers of the garrison should sign the test. To this proposition, however, Colonel Bell replied by a letter characterized by Mr. Cole as “a compound of incomprehensible ‘confusion of matter, aimed evidently to gain time’ and to fabricate excuses for conduct which the ‘brightest genius could not palliate.’” In his letter Colonel Bell had amongst other things requested that military proceedings against him might be for the present stayed.

Before the receipt of Colonel Bell’s letter information had reached Mr. Cole that the two battalions at Chittledrúg, after plundering the treasury of about 80,000 rupees, and having been reinforced by a third corps, had begun their march for Seringapatam. Mr. Cole at once despatched 1,500 peons armed with matchlocks and 3,000 Silladar Horse to manœuvre between them and the fortress.

Meanwhile Colonel Bell, having stored a quantity of grain sufficient for several months’ consumption,

wrote to Mr. Cole threatening to destroy the bridges over the Káverí and to cut off all communication with Mysore unless he should withdraw his troops from the field. He also placed a guard over Púrnia's house in Seringapatam, in which his collections of twenty years had been stored, in revenge for the rejection of an overture he had made to that Dewán. It was clear that, counting upon his strong position, upon the universally spread disaffection, and upon the rumoured action of the officers of the Hyderabad contingent, he and his colleagues had cast away the scabbard, not to sheath it until the opinion of the Governor-General, Lord Minto, should have been pronounced upon the proceedings of Sir George Barlow.

All this time the two battalions from Chittledrúg, unaided by the third to which I referred, were advancing. They were met on the 7th August by the peons and the Mysore horse, but these latter fell back before them. There was an unwillingness on both sides to begin a contest. They reached the neighbourhood of Seringapatam on the 10th August. The Mysore Irregulars were there joined by the 25th dragoons, the 59th regiment, a detachment of native cavalry, and a native battalion whose officers had been interned on the coast. Encouraged by this reinforcement the Mysore horse advanced to check the mutinous battalions. These however fired upon and repulsed them. Upon this the 25th dragoons came to the rescue. The men of the battalions, who had been ordered not to fire upon Europeans, did not wait their charge, but, dispersing, made for a part of the river commanded by the fire of the fort. Under that

fire the greater part of them succeeded in entering Seringapatam.* Their commandant, however, was wounded and made prisoner, and one officer was killed. During the night Colonel Gibbs' encampment was cannonaded from the fortress, and compelled to move backwards.

Subsequently, on the 14th August, a conference was held between Colonel Davies on the one side and Lieutenant-Colonel Bell and two other officers on the other. The result was unsatisfactory, Colonel Bell and his associates professing their determination to adhere to their attitude 'until the arrival of Lord Minto.'

But a heavy blow was awaiting them. The officers of the Hyderabad Contingent who had been the loudest in their denunciation of the conduct of the Government of Fort Saint George,† had yielded, on the 11th August, to the representations of Colonel Close, sent specially for that purpose from Púma. They had written a penitential letter to Lord Minto, then expected at Madras; had signed the test, and had subscribed a paper to be circulated to the army generally in which they stated that imperious circumstances and

* Their returns were :

9 killed.

150 wounded.

281 missing.

† They had published a letter to the army and to the suspended officers, declaring their entire disapprobation of the suspension and removal of so many valuable officers from the service and their commands; their willingness to contribute to the support of these officers; and their determination to co-operate with the army in all legal measures for the removal of the cause of the present discontent, and the restoration of their brother-officers to the honourable situations from which they had been removed.—*Mill.*

mature reflection had induced them to sign the test paper, and they earnestly entreated their brother-officers to follow their example. This paper reached Mr. Cole on the 18th August. He at once transmitted it ‘to the officers composing the garrison of Seringapatam’ with a very few lines from himself.

This communication after having been long and anxiously considered, was personally replied to on the 21st. On the morning of that day two officers* from the fort came into Mysore under a flag of truce. They were received by Colonel Davies and Mr. Cole. They stated that an address similar to the Hyderabad address was in course of signature, and they urged that until the signature should be completed, which might be expected in a few hours, hostilities on the part of the Government forces might cease. To this the two representatives of the Government replied that beyond a cessation of hostilities during the night they would listen to nothing except that which involved “the actual delivery of the fort and the arms of its present retainers;” further, that they would hold no communication with Colonel Bell.

The following day all the officers signed the address and the test ; on the 23rd they surrendered the fortress, and the arms of themselves and their men ; the latter were at once marched off the island in four bodies to separate positions. The fort was occupied by H. M.’s troops the same day.

The fate of the officers may possibly excite

* Captain de Havilland and Captain Cadell.

some interest. I supply it, therefore, so far as I have been able to collect information on the subject. Colonel Bell was brought to a Court Martial, and sentenced to be cashiered;* the others, I believe all of them, were interned in stations on the coast. These latter, however, were restored to active service in 1811 ; Colonel Bell and other officers who had suffered similarly for their conduct in other stations, were restored at subsequent dates. The matter then passed into such oblivion that with the exception of Mill, no Indian historian has noticed it.† Yet it was a very serious business. "The East India Company" wrote Lord Minto, "and, I may add, the British Empire in all its parts, never, I believe, was exposed to greater or more imminent danger." Nor was it creditable to any of the leading parties in the transaction. If the conduct of the officers was mutinous, that of Sir George Barlow was tyrannical. This was evidently the opinion of Lord Minto. For, whilst he condemned unequivocally the conduct of the officers, he refrained from exercising that arbitrary and absolute power the misuse of which by Sir George Barlow had led them to mutiny. He pardoned many, and left the others to be tried by their own ordinary tribunals.

The main results were practicably unfavourable to Sir George Barlow. Almost all the grievances complained of by the officers were silently remedied ; and if it may be said that their leaders were cashiered,—only

* The Government, not considering the sentence sufficiently severe, sent it back for revision ; but the Court adhered to it.—*Mill.*

† It is referred to by Mr. Krishna Rao, in his little history of Mysore.

however to be restored,—it may be urged on the other hand that the recall of Sir George Barlow a year later was due to the conduct which had roused all the officers of a large army beyond their power of self-control.

With this episode terminates the sensational history of Seringapatam. Abandoned as a military station, on account of the malaria which prevailed there, some years subsequently to the events last recorded ; the gun carriage manufactory broken up, and the ramparts dismantled ; it has remained thenceforth, as it remains still, an object of wonder and of interest. There are those, I have been told, who can see it for the first time unmoved, but I have not met them on the spot. Never have I beheld the man who could look at that breach without awe and admiration. The Hungarian who can boast of his Comorn ; the Belgian who is proud of his Antwerp ; the Frenchman who till within a few years, alas ! could talk of the virginity of Metz ; have all uncovered before the marvellous feat of which that broken parapet is a silent witness ; and have acknowledged, with a solemnity which attested the genuineness of the utterance, that England need never fear for her predominance, so long as she can produce sons eager to emulate that achievement of their fathers.



A P P E N D I X.

*Minute by the MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
dated 2nd November 1855,*

SERINGAPATAM.

- 1.—My journey through the Mysore territories has afforded me an opportunity of visiting this memorable fortress, the scene of events most glorious to the British name, and of happy augury for the people of Mysore.
- 2.—There are two objects within the Island which are well worthy of the protection of the Supreme Government, and which call for its respectful care.
- 3.—The first of these objects is the Tomb in which rest the remains of Hyder Ally Khan and of Tippoo Sultan. The structure is well preserved, as far as the means of its guardians will permit, its interior and the gardens by which it is surrounded are well kept, and it is under the immediate charge of one of Tippoo Sultan's family. But it already feels the pressure of the hand of Time. The endowments are insufficient for maintaining it in complete repair, and some portions of it, more especially the inlaid doors, have already become dilapidated.
- 4.—The Tomb is itself an imposing structure, and an interesting specimen of the style of art which marked the days and the dynasties that are past. The Court of Directors have most cheerfully and liberally given their sanction to the general expenditure which I proposed to make for the purpose of preserving such works of Art, for the instruction and gratification of the generations that shall come after. In this particular instance I feel certain that I correctly interpret the sentiments of the Honourable Court when recording my belief that it would be their especial desire to manifest an enduring respect for the last resting place of brave and fallen enemies.
- 5.—I shall therefore request the Commissioner to take measures for replacing the worn-out inlaid doors of the Tomb, and for expending such sums upon it from time to time as may be required for its proper repair, whenever the funds of the endowments may be inadequate to meet such expense.
- 6.—The second object on the Island to which I have alluded is the House in the Dowlut Bagh which was long occupied by the Duke of Wellington, then Colonel Wellesley, after the fall of Seringapatam, and when he held charge of the Mysore Territories.
- 7.—This mansion, formerly a Garden House of Tippoo Sultan, is traditionally known on the spot as the residence of Wesley Sahib, and I have just now seen and talked with an aged man, who remembers and describes his residing in it. This building, which has been unoccupied for some time past,

and in which I now write these words, is visibly falling into decay. It is a purely Eastern residence; and some of the walls are covered with paintings, executed by the orders of Tippoo, and still traceable, though greatly faded, which represent the defeat of the British Force, under the command of Colonel Baillie. The paintings were partially obliterated by Tippoo during the last siege of Seringapatam, and were in the first instance restored by Colonel Wellesley himself.

8.—In all respects this structure is one full of interest, but it is most especially

Letter from Colonel Wellesley to Colonel Rose, dated Trichinopoly, Dec. 30th, 1800, preserved in original in the records of the Commissioner's Office at Bangalore: "I have received a letter from Lord Wellesley in which he talks of going through Mysore in the next season." He proposes to inhabit the Dowlut Bagh at Seringapatam, and although I think it very probable that the plan will never be put in execution, I shall be obliged to you if you will now and then take a look at my house, and urge forward the painting of it."

worthy of our reverential care, as the material object, which, more than any other now remaining in India, most immediately and most vividly brings before us of this day the memory of that great man, with the early period of whose glorious career the East India Company must ever be proud to connect the history of its rule.

9.—I request therefore that the Commissioner will cause this House to be put into proper repair and to be maintained in that condition for the future. It should be upheld as nearly as possible in the condition in which it was left by Colonel Wellesley, and in which it still is. The paintings on the walls to which I have alluded above should be restored, if, as I am assured, their correct restoration can be effected by the aid of persons still living who remember them in their completeness. In further aid of the main object now held in view the enclosure of the Dowlut Bagh shall not be suffered to fall into decay.

10.—The Commissioner will be so good as to place this Minute upon his records, and upon those of the office of the Superintendent, Ashtagram Division, who will consider this building as at all times an object of his special attention.

11.—When the separate Department of Public Works shall have been organized in Mysore, Colonel Wellesley's House in the Dowlut Bagh at Seringapatam will form a separate head of account, and a separate head in each Annual Report of the Chief Engineer.

12.—By this means I trust that the building with all its memories and associations may long be preserved for the contemplation and reverence of generations to come.

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

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